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Abstract
Translational research requires a team approach to scientific inquiry and product development.
Translational research teams consist of basic and clinical scientists who can be members of both
academic and industrial communities. The conception, pre-clinical testing, and clinical evaluation of
a diagnostic or therapeutic approach demands an intense interaction between investigators with
diverse backgrounds. As the barriers between industry and academia are removed, issues of
potential conflict of interest become more complex. Translational researchers must become aware
of the situations which constitute conflict of interest and understand how such conflicts can impact
their research programs. Finally, the translational research community must participate in the
dialogue ongoing in the public and private sectors and help shape the rules that will govern conflicts
that arise during the evolution of their research programs.
Introduction
By its nature, translational research crosses boundaries
between basic science and clinical application. It places
researchers in new contexts and ushers in a range of new
contacts and relationships. Crossing these boundaries
contributes directly to the creativity and social impact of
translational medicine. But crossing these boundaries also
gives rise to new and often conflicting obligations
between researchers, their employers, and their industry
sponsors. The public is rightfully concerned that the
financial interests of researchers, their institutions, and
their corporate sponsors may bias research. Yet history
also teaches us that industry collaboration is often essen-
tial in realizing the promise of translational research.
Industry collaboration has figured prominently in many
translational research successes including recombinant
growth hormone, angioplasty, stenting for coronary artery
disease, and many new medications and diagnostic
devices [1].
Translational researchers must, therefore, understand
what financial conflicts of interest are and how they are
managed. Their industry partners must understand the
constraints placed on researchers by federal and university
policies as well as state laws. Relevant policies in the
United States include the regulations issued by the Public
Health Service and published as part of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations (42 CFR 50.601–50.607) and in the
National Science Foundation Grant Policy Guide (Section
510) [2,3]. Laws governing the use of state-owned
resources may also be relevant for those working at or
with public universities.
What triggers financial conflicts of interest?
Conflicts may arise whenever researchers' outside, per-
sonal financial interests have the potential to compromise
an investigator's professional judgment and independ-
ence in the design, conduct, or publication of research.
The most commonly regulated financial interests include
consulting fees or compensation for personal services,
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equity or other ownership interests, royalties, and intellec-
tual property rights. A researcher may, for example, receive
consulting income or equity in exchange for service on a
scientific advisory board of a company that then sponsors
clinical research in her lab. Another researcher may be
paid for talks to physician groups about an approved
medication while simultaneously conducting research on
potential off-label uses of the drug. The investigator or an
immediate family member may hold stock in the research
sponsor. These examples are all common cases and most
institutions have relatively standardized ways of manag-
ing such common conflicts.
Greater challenges are created when the financial relation-
ships between commercial interests and investigators are
either ambiguous or complex. Ambiguity can result in a
number of ways, but one of the most frequent occurs
when investigators approach consulting as an extension of
discussions among academic colleagues. Thinking that
talking to a corporate representative is the same as talking
to an academic colleague, for example, may lead the
investigator to make inappropriate disclosures that com-
promise intellectual property rights or contractual obliga-
tions. Often it is not any one financial interest, but rather
the combination of multiple financial interests that makes
a situation unmanageable. It is extraordinarily difficult,
for example, to manage situations in which an investiga-
tor is the founder of a startup company, an inventor on a
patent licensed to the company, a consultant to the com-
pany, and the recipient of other government and industry
grants for closely related research.
How institutions manage potential conflicts of 
financial interest
Spurred by a combination of bad experiences and new
regulations, most research institutions now have policies
in place for the management of some aspects of personal
financial interests in research. One strategy is simply to
prohibit personal financial interests in research. The Asso-
ciation of American Universities, for example, advocates
outright prohibition in cases involving research on
human subjects unless there are "compelling circum-
stances" that justify an exception [4]. Prohibition forces
financially interested researchers to either divest their
interests or to remove themselves from the research.
Although effective, prohibitions are blunt tools and in our
opinion should be used only as a last resort. We say this
not only because prohibiting financial interests may leave
any number of other equally biasing interests in place [5],
but also because, when properly managed, financial inter-
ests may play a positive role in the development of a trans-
lational research program. Access to company resources
and sharing investigator knowledge are often critical to
timely translations of basic science to clinical practice. The
complex research enterprise needed to develop clinical
products is simply beyond the scope of what many inves-
tigators can achieve on their own in academic institutions.
Fortunately, there are usually less draconian alternatives
to outright prohibition. These strategies seek to ensure the
integrity of the research, guarantee public scrutiny and
access, and, of course, to protect human participants [6].
One of most common is to assign key research activities
such as recruiting, consenting, and data analysis to team
members who have no financial stake in the results.
Multi-center designs ensure that the biases of any one
investigator are less likely to influence the final results.
Independent data safety monitoring boards or other over-
sight committees may also check the influence of personal
financial interests. So, too, will requirements to disclose
financial interests to publishers, conference organizers,
and institutional review boards.
Research integrity is further protected by a vigilant stance
regarding publication restrictions. Industry partners have
a legitimate interest in protecting proprietary informa-
tion, but this can usually be honored by providing a short
period for review prior to submitting a manuscript for
publication. No contract or agreement, however, should
give the sponsor the right to control publication. Work
that requires such control is more appropriately done in
industry rather than in academic laboratories. The close
attention to publication restrictions is particularly impor-
tant when a researcher may have a student working on an
industry sponsored project. Junior and student scientists
working in a research program, who may not have any
relationship with a company, must be able to have free-
dom in pursuing aspects of projects outside the bounds of
the research agreement and publishing data in a timely
fashion.
Translational research that results in the development of a
new company presents particular opportunities and chal-
lenges. Because of the importance of small companies to
economic growth, public research universities often view
the number of university-related startups as an index of
their contribution to the state economy. More specific
institutional interests are created when universities take
equity in startups through licensing agreements. Unlike
more established firms, start-up companies are often
highly dependent on obtaining favorable research out-
comes from a particular project. In many cases, prohibi-
tion may be the only way to manage the tangle of
institutional and individual interests than can result in
this situation. Universities may create "firewalls" between
the management of equity and researchers [7]. They may
require divestiture or bar researchers from receiving grants
back from companies to which their inventions have been
licensed. Consulting and other company contacts may beJournal of Translational Medicine 2004, 2:28 http://www.translational-medicine.com/content/2/1/28
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restricted when the investigator or the university has a sig-
nificant financial interest in the startup. Although univer-
sities are still coming to grips with their own institutional
financial interests, there is an emerging consensus that
they should not conduct clinical research on their own
inventions unless a strong case for locating the research at
the university can be made on clinical grounds [8,9]. For
novel biologic therapies, the investigator who invented
the approach may be ideally suited to complete the clini-
cal translation. The failure of many novel agents to dem-
onstrate activity in Phase I may be linked to a disconnect
between the scientist developing the agent and the physi-
cian running the clinical trial. Translational research is
defined as that person being one and the same.
Recently, the American Association of Medical Colleges
published suggested guidelines for the management of
conflict of interest based on input from a number of med-
ical schools [10]. Such documents not only encourage
dialogue concerning these issues, but also provide some
guidance for individual institutions establishing their
internal policies.
How financial conflicts of interest can affect your 
research program
Unrecognized and unmanaged conflicts of financial inter-
est represent major risk factors for programs of transla-
tional research. Even when properly disclosed and
managed, however, outside financial interests may limit
your research activities in a variety of ways, ranging from
mild to severe. If nothing else, time and staff resources
must be allocated to institutional and extra-institutional
review processes. Because approval is required before
funding is released or human subjects are enrolled, the
pace of research is slowed by outside financial interests.
Scientists with personal financial interests in the research
will usually find themselves barred from participating in
sensitive research activities, especially those involving
direct contact with human subjects. This increases the
costs of research as additional staff or consultants are
hired to do the work that the financially interested party
would have otherwise performed. But even this strategy
may prove difficult if key staff or alternative expert con-
sultants also have financial interests. There is a tipping
point beyond which so many potential team members are
financially involved that the interests simply can not be
managed and outright prohibition becomes the only
option.
In the most extreme circumstances it is possible for
researchers to research themselves out of a job. Their per-
sonal financial interests in a research sponsor may be so
great or so complex that their employers are unable to
accept further funding from that sponsor. A line of trans-
lational research may simply end for a researcher when he
or she is barred from carrying the work into the clinical
arena as a result of individual or institutional financial
interests. This can occur even when the researcher is not
actively seeking financial gain. Early basic science work,
for example, may lead to an invention that the university
decides to patent and license. In most universities the
researcher is entitled to a share of whatever revenue is pro-
duced. The researcher now has a personal financial inter-
est that requires management and may disqualify her or
him from participation in later clinical work designed to
translate the basic science into practice. This is an extreme
case, of course, but it does happen and it illustrates the
often unseen and unintended implications of how finan-
cial interests are usually managed.
Dealing intelligently with financial interests in 
research
Public concern about personal and institutional interests
in research is not going to go away. Nor is the need for
industry collaboration in translational research. Indeed
the need for collaborations between industry and
academia is only going to grow as we move beyond a
sequential "bench to bedside" model to acknowledge the
benefits of combining clinical and basic biological studies
[11]. If financial interests can not be avoided, we can at
least be more thoughtful about how we manage them-as
individual researchers, as industry collaborators, and as
academic research institutions.
Individual investigators should recognize that disclosure
of personal financial interests, while perhaps uncomfort-
able, is vital to continued public confidence in science.
They must also balance their wish for personal gain
against the additional oversight and management of their
activities that will inevitably result. They should recognize
that some financial interests are more easily managed
than others. Consulting income paid as cash, for example,
is much more easily managed than consulting income
paid with equity in the company. The latter creates a long-
term financial interest and may imply management influ-
ence. The understandable desire to "share the wealth"
with team members by assisting them in obtaining out-
side financial interests of their own backfires when it then
becomes necessary to remove them from the tasks that
they were hired to do in the first place.
The decision to create a company in order to further a
translational research agenda is appealing, often appro-
priate, but always more complex than researchers typically
appreciate. It is a risky conceit to believe that one's success
in obtaining research grants and managing a research
team is adequate preparation to launch a business. This is
borne out by the fact that technologies licensed to compa-
nies founded by faculty inventors are generally less suc-Journal of Translational Medicine 2004, 2:28 http://www.translational-medicine.com/content/2/1/28
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cessful than those licensed to companies with non-
academic founders [12]. Even when the researcher has the
requisite business experience, however, company forma-
tion may result in profound conflicts of commitment,
inappropriate use of university resources in support of the
company, and confusion over intellectual property. These
difficulties combine to increase costs and slow, if not
block, progress on translational research efforts.
In spite of a growing entrepreneurial spirit within
academia, the culture gap between industry and academia
remains large. Industries seeking to partner with academic
researchers must understand that universities are not sim-
ply laboratories for hire. They should not assume that they
will own or control publication of the research they sup-
port. Universities are not set up to guarantee the same
level of security and secrecy than can be obtained in
industry laboratories. The open character of universities is
in fact an asset- it is the foundation on which the creative
engine rests. Finally it is useful to appreciate that "indirect
costs" are real costs for universities. Indeed, even at the
full rate, universities subsidize research contracts [13].
Efforts to avoid indirect costs, like efforts to negotiate con-
tracts that contain publication restrictions and overreach-
ing intellectual property clauses, ultimately have the effect
of disrupting working relationships and slowing the pace
of research. By the same token, industry collaborators
should recognize that efforts to "build relationships" with
academic researchers and their staff by providing extra
financial incentives and benefits are often counterproduc-
tive, not only because they fail to buy loyalty, but also
because they create unacceptable financial conflicts of
interest for academic personnel.
Universities, too, have much to learn about managing
financial interests and collaborating creatively with their
industry partners. Although a consensus regarding institu-
tional conflicts of interest is emerging, universities still
have much to do in terms of implementation, particularly
with regard to credible external review of clinical research
opportunities in which the institution holds a financial
interest. Managing or avoiding institutional conflicts of
interest will also require a more realistic view of technol-
ogy transfer opportunities. Although "big hits" do occur,
they occur only rarely and revenue from technology trans-
fer operations is typically only a tiny fraction of revenue
from sponsored research. Universities run the risk of dis-
rupting their larger research mission by overly aggressive
efforts to capture and commercialize intellectual property.
Open publication and teaching should always be the most
significant "knowledge transfer" functions of a research
university.
The increasing complexity of translational research also
challenges universities to devise new kinds of collabora-
tion with industry. Mankoff and her colleagues, for exam-
ple, recently proposed the creation of centers that obtain
revenue from existing therapies, while simultaneously
providing material for biological studies and supporting
experimental therapies [11]. Before these more complex
collaborations can occur, however, there is much work to
be done to simplify material transfer practices between
laboratories and to create more straightforward ways for
facilities and personnel to be shared.
Individual researchers, industries, and universities have
much to learn about the management of financial inter-
ests. Given the potential for financial interests to disrupt
or even end programs of translational research, we believe
that all parties would benefit from greater attention and
greater creativity in the management of conflicts of inter-
est. A dialogue must be established between the individ-
ual investigator, industry, academic institutions, and the
public to define the issues and develop rational solutions.
Such a dialogue could be initiated by the development of
a focus on such topics at national meetings, by individual
organizations whose membership is involved in transla-
tional research developing interdisciplinary panels to dis-
cuss the issues and attempt to develop guidelines, and by
an integration of conflict of interest topics in the training
of junior scientists. Solutions should enhance, not
impede, translational research.
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